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ABSTRACT
The paper is a review of approaches towards technology support for small-scale
manufacturing enterprises in developing countries since the early 1970s. Early programmes
tended to suffer from a number of weaknesses, emanating from a limited conceptualisation of
technology and an inadequate understanding of the role of the small-scale sector in industrial
development more broadly. There was also a lack of practical experience with project
implementation. However, in recent years important advancements have been made on all
these fronts. Four features of recent technology assistance programmes that have tended to be
associated with success are discussed and illustrated with evidence from three projects.
Broadly, successful projects (a) embrace the notion that durable competitiveness of small
producers in a competitive economic environment requires that they develop internal
capabilities to effectively asssimilate, use, and adapt product and process technologies; (b) are
demand-driven; (c) target the assistance to groups of producers with common interests and
problems, and help them to organise themselves in collective bodies that can evolve into self-
help institutions; and that (d) design appropriate incentive structures based on market
principles.
Key words: technology support, small-scale industry, technological capability, learning,
competitiveness, assistance projects, industrialisation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author is grateful to Mike Albu, Jeffrey James and two anonymous referees for useful
comments on an earlier draft, and to Ruud Picavet for inspiring discussions and literature.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Small enterprises typically make a large contribution to manufacturing employment in
poor countries. However, the developmental contribution of the great majority of these
manufacturing companies is limited to generating subsistence employment ‘of last resort’.
Hence, in the face of fast labour force growth and limited employment absorption in other
sectors, developing country governments have mounted efforts to improve productivity and
earnings in these enterprises. This has spawned a plethora of policies and programmes, and an
almost boundless literature documenting these.
This write-up is a review of one specific subset of that literature, namely studies that
shed light on measures aimed at improving small producers' technological performance.
Compared to other forms of assistance, this type of support has received less attention
recently. Although much is being written about so-called Business Development Services
(BDS) for small manufacturing firms, of which technology support is a component, most of
the BDS literature tends to have a broader focus, dealing with issues such as management,
organisation, sales, employment, income and general quality. Few publications contain
technical details about upgrading of products, processes and production organisation, the
types of support needed to bring about such improvements, and a discussion about the
effectiveness of the support delivery mechanisms.
Yet, technological competence is an especially important determinant of small
manufacturers’ ability to hold their own in a context of liberalisation and increasing
integration of developing countries' manufacturing activities into global networks. Many of
their markets, even traditional ones, are undergoing fast change. In this situation, a lack of
capability to produce efficiently, meet deadlines, upgrade product quality and involve in
design spells defeat, while firms that are capable of keeping up with, or even initiate3
improvements in products, processes and production organization will be able to take
advantage of new opportunities and have an edge over competitors.
The main objective of the paper is to identify important common factors behind
success and failure of technology assistance projects.
1 Insight into the question as to what
constitutes 'best practice' in this field is still sorely lacking, and many are looking for
conceptual clarity with respect to these issues. The paper starts by drawing some lessons from
past debates and assistance interventions in section 2. Section 3 discusses some important
recent developments in the debate about small industry promotion more broadly, as these
hold some important lessons for current technical assistance practices. This sets the scene for
the discussion of recent practical approaches to project design and implementation in section
4, focusing on important principles behind success of new approaches that are likely to have
more general validity. A few case studies from promising technical assistance projects are
given in section 5 to illustrate these general principles. Conclusions are given in section 6.
The emphasis of this review is on small-scale ‘workshops’. Workshops are very
common throughout the developing world. They typically employ, say, between five and 50
people, including some hired labour. They have some division of labour and use basic
machinery, but their managerial practices and technological characteristics are worlds
removed from those of modern large companies. They tend to be engaged in well-established
or even traditional activities, making basic wooden furniture, processed foodstuffs such as
tofu and pasta, simple metal products such as tractor trailers, ploughs and window frames,
leather goods, local construction materials, and so on. Their customer base usually includes
large numbers of poor and lower middle class people. Except in some of the Asian NICs, few
workshops are in the forefront in new high-tech sectors, and only a small minority engages in
formal R&D.
2 Self-employed workers such as traditional blacksmiths, potters and weavers,
and very small family-run ‘micro-enterprises’ operating in the informal sector are not part of4
this review. The support programmes mounted for them are more focused on poverty




The small enterprise sector was firmly put on the mental map of LDC policy makers
in the early 1970s, as part of a general disenchantment with industrialisation strategies
favouring top-down modernisation through concentration of investment and expansion of the
modern large-scale sector that had been pursued in the 1950s and 60s. As the benefits of
‘trickle-down’ were apparently limited, income-creation approaches based on direct targeting
of poorer sections of the population gained widespread favour. The International Labour
Organisation took the lead in documenting the precarious position of those working in small
enterprises, and the serious constraints faced by them (e.g., Sethuraman, 1981).
Early technology support programmes predominantly adopted a ‘supply-push’
approach (UNDP et al., 1988). It was thought that the availability of a variety of services
would help overcome small producers' resource constraints and thereby help them to
strengthen their competitiveness. Many countries set up state-run small and medium industry
development organisations (SMIDOs) that were charged with the task of providing these
services. They covered such aspects as technical and management training, marketing
assistance, advice about technology choice, assistance with technology procurement and
provision of subsidised financen. The scope of these programmes was generally broader than
technological upgrading alone. However, there were also a number of bodies, both state and
NGO, that focused specifically on technology support. There have been some good results
from these programmes, but they were also beset with a large number of problems. Here, we
only discuss some issues that bear closely on technological support specifically. Inevitably,5
we have to employ a very broad brush approach which does not do justice to the specificities
associated with particular programmes and variations in conditions across different countries.
2.1 Underlying conceptual problems
In the early years of small enterprise promotion, the precarious existence of many
workshops was thought to be largely due to the fact that larger firms could be expected to be
more efficient as a result of economies of scale and the use of more modern and productive
techniques of production. The question whether small enterprises would be able to operate
efficiently at all was hotly debated. A number of studies were conducted that attempted to
find evidence in favour of the small firm, or vice versa, depending on the ideological bent of
the researchers (e.g., Little et al., 1987; Goldar, 1988).
On hindsight, the scope of this debate appears to be somewhat limited. The
technological problem of small producers was predominantly seen to be one of lack of
suitable machinery and equipment, in line with the prevailing literature about technology and
development in the 1970s (e.g., Sethuraman, 1977; Harper, 1984). Thus, their
competitiveness problem was viewed primarily in terms of their high relative unit cost of
production emanating from lack of appropriate hardware. There was as yet not much attention
for the fact that humanware, i.e., skills and knowledge to efficiently use, adapt and improve
the hardware, might also be in short supply and might constitute an equally crucial constraint
on the competitiveness of these enterprises. Moreover, the focus was on a comparison of cost
levels in individual small firms versus those of larger firms, i.e., there was no recognition of
potential competitive advantages that might accrue through exploitation of cluster or network
synergies involving groups of small firms. Meanwhile, the preoccupation with the
problematic horizontal (competitive) relations of small producers with their larger
counterparts prevented many researchers and policy makers to explore growth possibilities6
through development of complementary (vertical) relations, although some notable
exceptions did exist.
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To sum up, the main aim of the programmes at that time can be seen as bolstering the
competitive position of individual small firms relative to larger ones through the adoption of
more efficient ‘hardware’, with which they should be able to lower their cost of production
and/or improve the quality of their products. Presumably, a one-time injection with better
equipment would be sufficient to strengthen their competitive position in the economy.
Needless to say, such a one-time injection is useful, but it is inadequate by itself.
Competitiveness should derive from small producers’ capacity to absorb and improve process
and product technology on an ongoing basis. Yet, some useful lessons can be drawn from
these early programmes, which are discussed briefly below.
2.2     Lessons learnt
‘Appropriate’ technologies and their limitations
The question as to how technology for small firms (as defined above) could be
improved in the best way led to a big debate. Some claimed that efficient technologies suited
to small-scales of operation did not exist.
5 Others tried to show that such technologies did
indeed exist in several industries, but that there were serious disincentives to their adoption,
emanating from unfavourable macro-economic policies favouring the use of large-scale
modern techniques and boosting demand for products made with such technologies (Stewart,
1987; Bhalla, 1985; Stewart and Ranis, 1990; Haggblade et al., 1990).
Both arguments carried some weight. The first one led policy makers to promote
research in science and technology institutes aimed at the development of small-scale
efficient technologies. Different strategies were identified that could be adopted for achieving7
this (Bhalla et al., 1984; James, 1989). Foreign donors were much involved in these types of
projects. This was the golden age of the Appropriate Technology movement.
This approach gained a degree of success, but there have also been many failures.
Many so-called ‘appropriate’ technologies failed at the commercialisation stage. One big
lesson had to be that technology development in the public domain and its subsequent
diffusion to the private sector in top-down, 'supply-push' fashion was not an effective model.
6
Many scientists of the technology institutes were competent engineers, but they knew little
about the requirements of poor producers and communities, were usually located far away
from them, and had little awareness about social, economic and cultural contextual issues.
Even where that was not the case, significant communication barriers between developers and
prospective users tended to preclude effective exchange of information.
The success cases (which were mainly situated in East Asian countries such as Japan
and China) highlighted that technologies have to be developed in close collaboration with the
prospective users through a process in which these users can take significant control over the
direction of the project and in effect assume ownership of the technology. Another essential
condition for success is that equipment producers (i.e. local capital goods makers) have to be
involved at an early stage of development, since these actors (rather than the users or the
technology institutes) have to take care of repair, maintenance, replication, and modification
in the light of practical experience by the users. Technologies are rarely perfect when they
come ‘off-the-shelf’. Often, several rounds of forward and backward feedback of information
between developers and users are needed to improve and adapt them in iterative fashion. For
this reason, the best technology development model appears to be one which involves close
and ongoing interaction between users, institutes and producers as equal partners with
complementary knowledge and skills.
7
Lack of incentives and competitive pressures8
There were other major design and implementation flaws associated with many of
these early programmes. Supplying crucial missing ingredients to small companies is a good
thing in underdeveloped economies where well-functioning markets for essential services
rarely exist, but in practice it has all too often bred complacency among the recipients. There
were cases where small entrepreneurs took the assistance for granted simply because they
belonged to the underprivileged class of small entrepreneurs. This has been especially the
case when projects providing assistance with product design and quality simultaneously
provided an assured public outlet for the produce, leading to the removal of competitive
pressure.
There have also been problems with the incentive structures in the institutions
providing the assistance. Providing support for small companies is not as rewarding and
glamorous as assistance to bigger business. It is less visible, it does not bring political
influence or important contacts, and much effort has to be put in to achieve good results. Not
surprisingly, the most successful technology support projects have involved highly committed
individuals who were not primarily driven by high monetary rewards.
8 In addition to lacking
incentives, many programmes have lacked effective sanctions on inadequate performance of
asisstance agencies. State-run or parastatal organisations were functioning with ‘soft budget
constraints’ and did not have to rely on commercial sources of revenue for their continued
existence. The technological assistance under the SMIDO programmes have had even more
modest results than the programmes run by specialised technology development institutes and
NGOs, and it is not worthwhile to dwell much on their role and functioning.
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An unconducive macro-environment
The ‘macro-incentives approach’ to technology improvement mentioned earlier
gained considerable influence in the early 1980s, a bit later than the appropriate technology
approach. A series of studies were undertaken which linked inappropriate technology choices
to biased incentive structures emanating from adverse macro- and ‘meso’-level policies that
were commonly pursued in developing economies. Its arguments shed much light on why the
effectiveness of the early programmes remained so limited. It is probably true that the lack of
success of these programmes can be traced as much to problems in the general economic and
institutional environment in which they had to function as to flaws in conception, design and
implementation at the micro-level.
In particular, the problem of lack of market opportunities faced by small enterprises
referred to above, was at least partly caused by the general economic malaise and the lack of
growth possibilities for small companies in many economies pursuing import-substitution
strategies that favoured modern, large-scale forms of production. Highly overvalued local
currencies and cheap credit for large import-substituting companies made it attractive for
them to establish highly integrated production facilities with a high import content. There was
little incentive to establish backward linkages to local companies. The impact of policies such
as tax and financial incentives and local content regulations has generally been very modest.
10
To the extent that the approach advocated ‘to get the prices right’, it tied in well with
the sort of reforms that countries had to introduce when they embarked on structural
adjustment. However, the approach went well beyond pointing towards biased factor prices. It
also drew attention to major institutional, legal and structural constraints that prevented the
small industry sector from flourishing, and that could not be remedied quite so easily.10
Lack of integration of small enterprise programmes with national industrialisation strategies
The macro-incentives approach was particularly useful because it began to raise
awareness about how the small industry sector was linked to, and affected by what was
happening in the economy in general. Curiously, the studies about small-scale enterprises and
the informal sector that were generated in the 1970s never made any mention of the modern
industrial sector, while studies about countries’ industrialisation in general in turn tended to
disregard the small industry sector. This lack of integration in research had its effect on the
policy level. Policy makers generally did not properly integrate the promotion of their small
industry sector within their broader industrialisation strategies and objectives, almost as if it
was existing in a vacuum. Many countries still suffer from such legacies, even those that have
made a serious effort at reforming their industrial policies to incorporate the small enterprise
sector (see, e.g., King, 1996; and Oladeji, 1998).
3. THE 1990S: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
The practice of technology support interventions has moved forward in recent years,
especially since the early 1990s. Partly, this reflects some major changes in the broader debate
about small industry development and its role in industrialisation in general. In this section,
therefore, we highlight some important lessons which are emerging from this debate for the
way in which technology support projects could best be designed and implemented in
practice. Sections 4 and 5 focus on recent innovative approaches at the project level that have
begun to absorb these lessons, along with the findings from earlier project practices discussed
above.
The small industry debate has clearly been influenced by the major changes in the
economic policy climate that have occurred since the late 1970s. The ascent of neo-liberal11
thinking which de-emphasised state involvement in the economy, spelled the demise of
inward-looking approaches to industrialisation, and advocated increased openness to trade
and foreign investment. The effects of these policies on local industrialisation have been
varied. Some of the relatively advanced developing countries in East and Southeast Asia and
Latin America are increasingly being integrated in large regional and/or global trade and
production networks that are steadily growing in importance. In contrast, in many of the truly
low-income economies, where liberalisation took place in the context of heavy structural
adjustment programmes, industrial development has suffered (Lall, 1999). Sub-Sahara
Africa’s share in global manufacturing, already very low with 0.4 percent in 1985, declined to
0.3 percent ten years later (UNIDO, 1996, p.22).
11
In either case, however, the old notion that economic prospects for small industries
would derive mainly from their ability to achieve competitive cost levels with appropriate
equipment proved increasingly inadequate in the context of the big shift in countries’ macro-
economic climate and the forces pushing for global integration and marginalisation. One can
notice important common elements of change in the literature about small industry
development across major regions. In particular, the old view that small producers could
improve their competitiveness by absorbing technical improvements designed elsewhere by
other actors is beginning to be replaced by a more dynamic notion of competitiveness, one
that depends on small firms' own internal capacity to make an independent and unique
contribution to local technical progress on an ongoing basis. This is happening in Asia, Latin
America and Africa alike, although inter-regional variations exist, as the following discussion
highlights.12
3.1 Advanced LDCs: Small firms, technical capability and systemic competitiveness
The change is perhaps most evident in the most advanced and fast-industrialising
developing economies of Asia and Latin America (especially the East Asian NICs), where
there is much potential for small firms to participate in their export-oriented industrialisation
drive and their increasing participation in international trading and production networks. In
the dynamic industrial environment of these countries, small firms' competitiveness begins to
be perceived as an integral part of national industrial competitiveness. This is mainly because
of the perceived complementarity of the activities that large and small firms undertake. The
emphasis is on the need for local specialist suppliers that can supply products and services to
customers downstream in the ‘value chain’, react quickly and flexibly to their changing
requirements, and begin to play a role in the design and implementation of technological
improvements. Thus, competitiveness of small companies is increasingly being perceived in
terms of their internal capabilities to choose, use, adapt and develop technology. Such
capabilities are a must in order to become, and retain competitiveness in a fast-evolving
environment which continuously places new demands upon large and small firms alike (see,
e.g., the studies in Meyanathan, 1994; and UNIDO, 1996, pp. 53-6)
  By moving in this direction, the small enterprise literature from these relatively
advanced developing countries is beginning to link up with a large body of literature about
acquisition of technological capability in industrial development.
12  This lilterature largely
replaced the old static choice of technique framework which underpinned the early small firm
support programmes discussed earlier. Its basic point of departure is that the existence of
adequate local skills and knowledge for incorporating more advanced technologies in
developing countries cannot be taken for granted. Whereas technological hardware
(machines, equipment, blueprints) can be transferred, the capability to make use of that
hardware has to be developed through a gradual learning process, resulting from purposive13
efforts to assimilate, adapt and modify the new technology. Many of these efforts take the
form of small improvements ‘on the shop floor’, rather than formal R&D. In contrast to the
earlier choice of technique literature, the capability literature sees technological constraints
primarily in the lack of human knowledge and skills rather than machines, and it views
technological progress as endogenous to firms and within developing countries more broadly.
This literature holds important lessons for the design of technology support projects for small
manufacturers.
The trends towards a more dynamic interpretation of small firm technological
performance and competitiveness in line with this body of literature are evident even in
countries like South Korea and Singapore, whose earlier policies were heavily biased towards
the promotion of large-scale firms. There has been a remarkable shift in their policy-stance
since the early 1980s, when they began to experience the difficulties associated with
advancing into higher-technology-based manufacturing without an extensive local
subcontractor network (Wong, 1994; Lee, 1992; Leipziger and Petri (1993); Chon, 1996; and
Chung and Park, 1998).
3.2 Middle-income LDCs: Dynamism in small industry clusters
Another important contribution to the recent debate about small industry development
with implications for technology support programmes has come from a set of studies
emphasizing efficiency of groups of SE, especially how inter-firm interactions in networked
geographical clusters might contribute to their collective competitiveness (e.g., Humphrey
and Schmitz, 1996; Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1996; Tewari, 1996; Rabelotti, 1995; Ceglie and
Dini, 1999). Much of this literature is focused on middle-income developing countries in Asia
and Latin America, such as Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico and Peru, but there14
are also some contributions dealing with lower-income African countries. Their main concern
is similar to the literature discussed above, namely internal economic dynamism of small
producers, although the main emphasis is on interfirm dynamics rather than on intra-firm
learning processes. Drawing on writings about flexible specialisation in dynamic industrial
districts in developed countries such as Italy (e.g., Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; Pyke
and Sengenberger, 1992), these studies have generally suggested that clustering in developing
countries can create effects that help sustain long-term economic competitiveness among the
participating firms. Presumably then, the writers presuppose that it may also give rise to
enhanced capability to initiate and diffuse technological improvements. Unfortunately, this
claim has remained largely unsubstantiated. The assumption about technological dynamism
remains largely implicit, and the innovation and learning effects have not been investigated
systematically. Even though the term ‘learning’ tends to crop up in some of the studies, it is
often not clear what is meant by this, or what the learning entails in practice  (Albu, 1997).
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3.3 Poor LDCs: Technological capability building by individual producers
A final important contribution to the recent small enterprise literature with
implications for design and implementation of technology assistance programmes has come
from studies focusing on the importance of internal technological capability acquisition in
individual small industrial units. Much of this literature is set in lower-income countries with
poor growth prospects, mostly but not exclusively in Africa. Here, the concept of small firm'
competitiveness is evolving more under duress than as a result of emerging opportunities.
These countries are increasingly feeling the crunch of international competition from more
advanced economies. Their own large-scale industrial sectors have all but collapsed, and they
are not being targeted in a big way by foreign investors. Hence, they are beginning to look15
towards small companies as a potential force for industrial regeneration. Increased attention is
being devoted to the question whether, or under what circumstances, small pruducers can
function as an engine of industrial growth and become a source of competitive advantage in
their own right. There is also a growing concern that such regeneration cannot and should not
be built on low wages, dismal working conditions and paltry profits, at least not beyond the
short term. Acquisition of more advanced technological capabilities is beginning to be
perceived as a major requirement for escaping from the low-wage, low-skills scenario in a
sustainable manner. It is also recognised that this will require a supportive policy
environment, one in which the small firm sector is fully integrated in the design and
implementation of industrial support programmes and technology policy (Wangwe, 1993;
Oladeji, 1998; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 1997; King, 1996; Maldonado and Sethuraman, 1992;
Massaquoi, 1995; Romijn, 1997 & 1999; Smillie, 1991; and the articles in Appropriate
Technology, June 1997).
4. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AT THE PROJECT LEVEL
The insights emerging from the recent conceptual debate about the role of small
industries in development are beginning to be incorporated in the design of technology
assistance projects, along with lessons learnt from accumulating hands-on experience with
project implementation by practitioners (section 2). There is reason to believe that the success
record of some of the more recent programmes is rather better than those of earlier ones.
Unfortunately, even now, only a few project studies have so far systematically
pinpointed the main project features that are believed to underpin their success. In view of
this, the discussion in this section cannot go much beyond identifying a few broad principles
which can be distilled from the reviews in section 2 and 3 of this paper, and which at the16
same time can be associated with success in technology assistance projects in practice. These
success features are present more strongly in some geographical regions than in others, but
quite often they do cut across regional variations.
4.1 Acquisition of indigenous technological capability
Perhaps the most important common factor that appears to be critical to improved
outcomes of technical assistance projects, is an emerging convergence in much of the recent
debate that a sustained improvement in the competitive position of small producers must
come from their acquiring internal technological capability to initiate and pursue adaptations
and improvements to products, processes and production organisation on an ongoing basis. In
their well-known review of small enterprise project interventions, Humphrey and Schmitz
(1996) hint at the need for this requirement when they state that competitiveness of small
producers is a process rather than a state. Therefore, they argue, one-off improvements are of
limited use, and projects need to aim for 'cumulative benefits' instead.
The implication of their important observation for the design of technological
assistance projects specifically appears to be, that they must aim to initiate and facilitate a
process of change which creates opportunities for small producers to engage in continuous
development of their technological knowledge, skills and organisation. The Donor Committee
on Small Enterprise Development, an umbrella group of big aid agencies which have
organised much of the ongoing BDS discussion, refers to this approach as 'indigenous
technology development' (Donor Committee on Small Enterprise Development, 1997, p.39-
40).
In this approach, the ultimate project objective is not the one-off design and adoption
of improved technological 'hardware'. That is not to say that the introduction of such
hardware should become unimportant or redundant. Making a mechanical lathe available to a17
woodworking shop, or introducing an improved cooking stove model for low-income
households to local metalworkers who are to manufacture it, obviously constitute
developmentally beneficial policy interventions in their own right. However, rather than
viewing the supply of these deliverables as final project objectives, the process of their
introduction into a local business community should also, and perhaps even primarily, be seen
as a means through which small producers can master new technical and organisational skills
and knowledge which will strengthen their ability to introduce other product and process
innovations on their own initiative at a later stage.
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The adoption of this notion has obvious implications for the modalities of assistance
delivery. Rather than using external experts to come up with a perfect design for a new
artefact, an appropriate adaptation of a foreign artefact to local conditions, or a quick fix to a
technical production bottleneck in a small workshop, projects that aim to stimulate
indigenous technology development must use those experts as teachers and facilitators who
will actively involve small producers in design, adaptation and problem-solving processes so
that these will create possibilities for them to build their own design skills. Other ways in
which projects can help producers to learn is to create, what Levy et al.(1994) have called, ‘an
information-rich environment’ for small firms, facilitating access to knowledge and
information that can form inputs into the learning process. Examples include projects
sponsoring courses on selected topics, organising field trips by producers to more advanced
factories, facilitating the use of specialised consultants, helping small producers to participate
in trade fairs, and promoting information sharing among firms.
4.2  Demand orientation
An effective way in which assistance agencies can trigger and sustain such processes
of indigenous technological capacity building in small firms is by taking a demand-led18
approach. That is, project interventions have to start by identifying a new market channel for
the target producers, and establishing concrete possibilities for them to establish themselves
in that new market (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; Tendler and Amorim, 1996; Dawson,
1999). There are different ways in which this has been achieved. Most of the evidence
pertains to the successful negotiation by assistance agencies to use (groups of) small
producers as suppliers in public procurement schemes, but there are also some examples
where assistance agencies have successfully mediated to link small producers to new private
sector clients.
There are at least two major advantages of this customer-focused approach over the
earlier supply-side project interventions reviewed in section 2. First, access to a dynamic
market in which producers are required to deliver products with improved designs or quality,
to pay attention to standardisation, to meet deadlines, to control their unit cost of production,
and so on, provides a financial incentive for small firms to invest in efforts to make the
improvements needed to live up to the expected standards. Second, it tends to focus the
project assistance quite tightly around supplying the critical missing inputs required to
overcome producer bottlenecks experienced in the process of trying to meet customer
demands and responding to their complaints. The assistance can be applied at once, i.e., there
is an immediate test of its practical relevance. This avoids the danger of projects supplying a
broad array of services that will ultimately not be useful in practice. A particularly effective
way to ensure that small producers get the right type of technical assistance has been an
arrangement in which a representative of (typically large) clients will agree to engage in
'buyer-mentoring' for a while, taking small suppliers under their wing, training them up and
providing technical consultancy, with the assisting agency meeting part of the costs involved
(see the case studies in Dawson, 1999; and Wong,1994).19
4.3 Organisation of groups of clustered firms
In most recent successful projects, the practical organisation of the type of assistance
outlined above has involved targeting groups of geographically clustered producers in the
same industry, rather than scattered individual small companies operating in a variety of
industrial sectors (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). A number of advantages of collective
support to clusters of small firms have been noted. First, it is simply more cost-effective and
practical for agencies to concentrate their efforts on the problems faced by groups of similar
producers in one or a few specific localities. This is especially important since aid projects are
increasingly under pressure from donors to ensure financial sustainability of their
interventions within a short period of time (Dawson and Jeans, 1997). It also allows agency
personnel to develop in-depth expertise about the technical, market and other problems of one
specific industry, and about the particular role played by the small producers in that industry
in a particular region.
15 Moreover, when the assisting institutions is based close to its clients,
it is in a position to develop a close working relationship with them, thereby overcoming
mistrust and establishing its credibility.
The learning efforts within the small firms may also be stimulated through interaction,
common problem solving, information exhange, and getting around problems associated with
economies of scale (e.g., setting up of a common facility centre by the assisting agency, or
joint investment by producers in expensive equipment which cannot be operated profitably by
only one company). Finally, organisation in groups may provide a convenient way to
overcome contractual problems with clients and to enforce compliant behaviour by the
companies participating in an assistance project. It is more practical and less costly for large
clients to deal with an association of small manufacturers than to share out orders among the
individual members, monitor their progress and deal with problems relating to order
fulfilment. Furthermore, the manufacturers association can put effective pressure on its20
individual members to perform according to the agreement, e.g. by making the group jointly
responsible for delivering the final outputs and honouring warranty claims.
4.4 Incentives that promote sustainability
A flawed incentive structure both for assistance providers and beneficiaries was one
of the chief causes of failure in the early technology support projects discussed in section 2. In
some of the recent projects, much attention has been devoted to the careful design of a more
appropriate set of incentives for all project participants (see especially Tendler and Amorim,
1996). This appears to entail a combination of ‘carrots’, i.e. potential rewards that will
motivate the participants to take action, and ‘sticks’, i.e. a set of sanctions that come into
operation when they fail to do their best. It seems that effective incentive systems appear to be
those which subject projects as much as possible to market discipline. Especially, there has to
be a payment system that rewards effective services offered by support staff, and penalises
those that don't work. Getting beneficiaries to pay (at least part of) the services offered is also
a way to ensure that they value the support and that they will utilize it.
That is not to say that some project activities may not require initial subsidies. They
do, because technological learning is subject to considerable market failure. E.g., the results
from technological efforts made by an innovating firm spill over to competitors through
copying and inter-firm movement of its trained labour, preventing the originator firm from
appropriating the full benefits of its investments. However, market failure is not an argument
for mounting interventions that have the effect of distorting or even completely replacing the
market by doling out permanently subsidized services of dubious value. Linking project
activities with market forces ensures that projects 'remain on track' by getting the right signals
about their activities from their client base and that the project staff remains motivated. Only
then will projects be able to bring about the sort of cumulative effects that Humphrey Schmitz21
referred to. Some projects now go so far as to aim not merely for cumulativeness in terms of
sustained occurrence of benefits for small producers and their customers (i.e. innovation and
improvement processes driven by ongoing learning) after project completion, but also apply
the notion to the delivery of the project services themselves. Dawson and Jeans (1997) argue
that projects must evolve certain institutional forms of self-help that will, over time, start to
function independently from external aid agencies. Organising producers and helping them to
build strong local collective institutions (already discussed above) can contribute in a major
way to the achievement of this goal.
5. SOME ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SPECIFIC PROJECTS
Several of the general principles outlined above have been applied in recent technical
assistance projects in different developing countries. We illustrate these points with three
examples, one of the industrially most advanced developing economies in East Asia, one
from a middle-income country in Latin America, and one from a low-income country in
Africa.
5.1 Upgrading local subcontractors in Singapore
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The Singaporean experience with technical assistance to small manufacturers is
perhaps not an obvious example. The country is better known for its success in attracting
high-tech multinationals than boosting local small-scale industries. This image is somewhat
misleading. Over the years this country has evolved a remarkably well-organised and
elaborate support system for small manufacturers, in which indigenous technical upgrading
takes up a central place. A local ancillary sector is considered to be crucial for Singapore’s
continued international competitiveness in high-tech electronics. For example, the presence of22
large TNCs in the disk drive industry depends on the availability of high quality suppliers in
precision engineering.
The country has been providing technological assistance to local small manufacturers
ever since 1962, but the programmes acquired real momentum in 1989 when the various
measures and initiatives were consolidated under the SME master plan presented by the
Economic Development Board (EDB) in 1989. Fabricated metal and machinery industries
receive most attention because these form the core group of supplier industries. The Local
Industry Upgrading Programme (LIUP) forms the most significant component of technical
assistance, a programme which clearly displays three of the four features discussed above,
namely a focus on technological capacity upgrading, a demand-driven approach to the
intervention, and a market-driven incentive structure. The fourth feature (group-based
assistance) is also present to some extent but its advantages are not spelled out clearly in the
available documentation about the programme.
•   The aim of the programme is to strengthen local manufacturers' internal technological
capabilities., involving increased operational efficiency (ability to produce according to
the exacting time schedules and quality standards required by TNC clients), as well as
increased ability to perform ongoing incremental improvements in products and
processes.The aim is ambitious: technical standards are to be raised to a level where the
small producers are able to compete succesfully with leading foreign suppliers, and in this
way form attractive partners to the local TNC community.
•   It has been been designed to forge close links between TNCs and their suppliers, taking a
demand-led approach to assistance delivery. The EDB is achieving this essentially by
playing the role of ‘network broker’, an idea that has also worked well in a few other
countries.
17 TNCs are approached by the EDB to participate in the project. When
agreement is reached with a TNC, an experienced engineer from the company is identified23
and seconded to the EDB to assume responsibility as LIUP manager for 2-3 years, whose
responsibility is to identify areas of focused assistance for the TNC's suppliers. A
participating TNC takes several small firms under its wing, and is expected to provide
training in areas such as management, quality control, process engineering and industrial
engineering through visits, workshops, consulting activities and so on (an example of
'buyer mentoring'). The EDB meanwhile arranges access for the participating small
companies to a variety of financial support schemes operated by and through it.
•   The incentive structure is such that the participating TNCs benefit from their efforts to
upgrade the operational efficiency of their client enterprises, while they also receive
considerable subsidies for providing their inputs in the project, up to 90 per cent of the
costs involved. These are partly borne by the EDB, but also partly by the participating
small producers themselves, which in turn helps to ensure their continued support and
commitment to the project. The programme is apparently effective because '... the benefits
are mutual, and market forces rather than administrative exhortation or compulsion
motivate the transfer of technology... ' (Wong, 1994, p.82).
As far as results go, it has been reported that various significant forms of
technological learning have been taking place, including learning through direct know-how
transfers; learning through feedback provided by stringent quality / performance control by
the TNCs; learning through exposure to information resources provided by the TNCs; and
learning through, and as a result of, investments in capital equipment and other forms of new
technology by the small firms that they would not have made in the absence of their
relationship with the supporting TNC.24
5.2 Technical upgrading through public procurement in Brazil
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One project that clearly displays all four features discussed above is a public
procurement scheme for school furniture in the Brazilian State of Ceará. The scheme was
organised by the Industry and Commerce Department (SIC) of the state government, together
with SEBRAE, the Brazilian SMIDO, after the central government decided to seek out
alternative, small-scale suppliers of wood products in regions that had been badly hit by a
drought, as a sort of alternative to a public works programme.
•   The scheme was very clearly demand-driven, in the sense that the project itself was
triggered off with the opening up of public procurement of basic manufactured products
by SIC to small-scale manufacturers. This created a potential new market outlet for them.
•   It was clear that technical assistance by SEBRAE would be needed to enable the small
woodworkers to ‘pull themselves up technologically’ in order to reach the required
production standards. The objective of the assistance was squarely to help raise the
internal technological capacity of local producers by providing them with technical
assistance and consulting services over a period of time. The customer-driven approach
led to a well-focused and efficient form of that assistance in which producers could learn
in incremental fashion: Producers participating in the project would hit up against
technical bottlenecks in the course of trying to fulfill SIC's requirements, and they would
call on SEBRAE engineers to provide help when they had identified the specific problems
they needed to solve in order to deliver the required quality at the agreed price at the right
time.
•   The support was narrowly targeted to a small collective of clustered small producers in
one particular locality operating in one particular activity (woodworking). This set-up
had a number of advantages. First, in view of the large orders from SIC, which exceeded
the production capacity of any one of the individual producers, it was only practical to25
contract the small producers as a group. A producer association was formed for the
purpose, with encouragement from SEBRAE. The association was responsible for
ensuring product quality and honouring product warranties, and had to coordinate the
activities of the individual members. In case of default of one of the association members,
the association was responsible for honouring orders and warranty claims. By making the
association the one focal point in the transactions, it was in the interest of members to
monitor each others’ performance. Meanwhile the existence of the association lowered
the transaction costs involved in dealing with SIC and SEBRAE. Moreover, group
formation enabled the producers to engage in collective learning because they had to
communicate and collaborate to solve common problems, and coordinate their activities
in order to meet large orders. SEBRAE engineers would typically come in only after the
producers had discussed their problems together and identified their assistance priorities.
•   However, the fact that technological upgrading actually did occur also had a lot to do with
the clever way in which the incentives of the scheme were designed. Two important
features mimicked the way in which a private market works, and they set up tremendous
pressures on the assistance deliverers and the beneficiaries to perform: Firstly, while a
new potential market opportunity was created, the customer  was not obliged to proceed
with the procurement from the small producers if the quality of the products remained
below that of the regular (large-scale) suppliers. Hence, rather than creating a protected
market, the scheme created competition between large and small. Secondly, by linking the
commission received by SEBRAE to the succesful securing of orders by the producers,
SEBRAE's financial position became to some extent dependent upon the effectiveness
with which they delivered their assistance, thus creating a clear incentive to perform well.
The success of this project is evident from upgraded skills, knowledge  and
management capabilities of the participating enterprises, as well as substantial investments26
made in power tools, expanded production capacity, creation of many backward and forward
linkages, and vastly increased employment in the industry locally. The most powerful
evidence of project sustainability is the fact that the producers were able to use their sales to
SIC as a starting point to enter new markets and diversify their customer base considerably.
Five years after the start of the project, 70 per cent of their output was already going to the
private sector. The association has become an important institution locally, initiating many
developmental activities without help from the original assistance agencies.
5.3 Technological capability building in small metal workshops in Kenya
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The Farm Implements and Tools (FIT) programme implemented in Kenya and Ghana
by the International Labour Organisation and TOOL, a Dutch NGO specialising in
technological assistance projects, is an example of a tightly focused, dynamic user-driven
approach to group-based technical assistance with a strong market-based incentive structure,
which is designed to operate under quite hostile economic conditions and in economies at a
low stage of economic, technological and infrastructural development. The focus here is on
the Kenyan component since this is the best-documented part of the programme. The
programme targets small manufacturers of metal farm equipment and food processing
equipment.
•   The aim is to strengthen their local capacity to undertake activities that can spark
technological upgrading of their products, ultimately contributing to higher productivity
and incomes of the technology users (i.e. farmers and people running home industries,
predominantly poor women). Technological learning by and among the participating
enterprises is central to the success of the programme. The programme essentially
functions as a facilitator for these learning processes, initiating activities and embedding
them institutionally in such a way that they become self-sustaining over time. Several27
services have been developed according to this philosophy which help to create an
information-rich environment. By broadening producers' access to information, the
producers are in a better position to analyse their own strengths and weaknesses in
relation to others, learn more about the needs of their users, and in what ways the
performance of their products falls short of user' expectations. It also gives them new
ideas for product improvements and for the introduction of new products, and so on. One
activity is the organisation of group visits by small producers to bigger enterprises
elsewhere in the country or abroad, which has strong demonstration effects. Another is the
facilitation of direct communication with the users of farm implements. ‘Brokering
workshops’ for groups of entrepreneurs, initially designed to evaluate the impact of these
two activities, became an independent activity in itself because the informal information
exchange that took place in these fora obviously filled a need among the participants.
Finally, help to small producers in identifying new markets through teaching them a
simple form of market research dubbed ‘rapid market appraisal’ has also been offered.
•   FIT is strongly demand-driven. According to the project organizers, ‘...the demand by
MSEs (micro-and small-scale enterprises, red.) for services is ultimately financed by sales
to their customers, and it is the demand and perceptions of these customers which are
therefore the origin of all sustainable activities with MSEs.’ (Tanburn, 1996, p.47). For
that reason, the activities undertaken by the project must translate into substantial and
reasonably quick improvements in products which benefit the customers. In contrast to
the other two projects discussed earlier, the FIT programme has not used public
procurement, but has mounted initiatives to stimulate demand from the private sector by
linking up producers with their customer base and helping to create a demand for
innovations. The project was able to do this because the end-users of the firms' products
(farmers) demonstrated a strong interest in interacting with the manufacturers, providing28
them with feedback about their performance and suggesting improvements and
innovations, to the point where they were willing to pay for their own transportation costs
to participate in user-producer meetings where improved farm equipment developed by
project participants was displayed.
•   The assistance is tightly targeted at groups of metalworking producers operating in the
same area, although it does not seem to involve tightly-knit geographically-confined
clusters as in the Brazilian project. This concept is in any case not so relevant in many
rural areas of Africa where the volume of production is simply too low for such clusters to
form. Three clear advantages of group-based assistance could be identified from the
available documentation about the project. First, the assistance can be focused specifically
on common areas of interest and concern, including specialised technical issues. Second,
it leads to informal information exchange and helps spark interactive learning among the
producers. Third, organising producers in groups is a means to form collective self-help
insitutions which can in due course take over the running the project activities.
•   The design of a market-based incentive structure has played a crucial role in achieving
sustainability of project benefits, as well as project services themselves. Project financing
of the activities is always temporary, and even right at the start of a new initiative the
participating producers as well as their customers must show a willingness to pay at least
part of the costs. Moreover, producers and other involves parties must show a willingness
to take over the organisation of the activity after the external input has come to an end.
When it is clear that an activity does not meet these requirements,the project discontinues
it quite quickly. One could argue that improvements may take some time to materialise,
and that some degree of market failure is therefore inevitable, justifying a permanent
public subsidy. However, in resource-poor countries like Kenya, the likelihood of such
activities attracting public money on a sustained basis is quite remote. In such conditions,29
projects like FIT, which do not expect such subsidies and adhere to stringent financial
viability conditions, obviously stand the best chance of success.
FIT has reported several favourable effects. Perhaps the strongest indication of
success is that the participating small firms continue participating in the programme over a
period of time, pay at least part of the cost of the services, and suggest the introduction of new
project activities such as help with establishing facilities for equipment testing, and help with
ironing out of teething problems encountered when new or improved farm implements are
used in practice. The group visits to other enterprises have been an important source of ideas
about new and improved farm equipment that the small firms could try to produce. Many
entrepreneurs also benefited from seeing metalworking machinery, tools and measuring
instruments in operation, and decided to acquire new tools such as scales, a micrometer and
so on. Improved linkages with suppliers of spare parts and raw materials were also reported.
Even managerial skills were apparently improved, especially in the area of customer relations,
record keeping and employee relations. The trade fairs were also quite successful as a vehicle
for effective user-producer interaction. Several producers started to experiment with products.
Some did so after they noticed the results of the technological efforts undertaken by their
competitors, afraid that they would lose custom if they did not keep up with the new
developments (an example of a ‘stick-type’ incentive in operation).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The practice of technology support for small producers has evidently come a long way
since the early 1970s. Firstly, and most important, the notion of ‘success’ in projects and
programmes is evolving in a more realistic direction. It is no longer based on the idea that
small producers should essentially play the role of passive recipients and beneficiaries of
improved technologies that have been developed elsewhere in the economy or abroad. We are30
moving towards the understanding that durable competitiveness of small manufacturers must
entail an internal capability on their part to make improvements in products, processes and
organisation on an ongoing basis. Only then can we expect such enterprises to make a
contribution to countries’ industrialisation which goes beyond mere employment generation
of last resort. Truly progressive developing economies are those where firms of all sizes,
including the smallest ones, are actively involved in, and contribute to, the national
knowledge accumulation process (Bruton, 1985, p.81).
Secondly, there is a growing understanding among LDC government agencies and
donors about the broad features associated with project success so defined. These principles
appear to be common to projects and programmes across regions that are technologically and
economically quite diverse. In particular, the development of producers’ capability will
generally need to entail a process of incremental and demand-focused technological learning
and organisational and institutional capacity-building by the people involved. The literature
reviewed for this paper also suggests that such learning is likely to be most effective when
producers can interact with each other and with other actors, especially  customers.
Effective projects are those that stimulate these processes by establishing conditions in
which such learning can occur. Linking producers to new markets is an important
precondition. Facilitating better acess to information, especially through  interactions with
other parties, is another aspect. Organising them in local groups with common interests and
problems and helping them to build collective self-help institutions is yet another element.
Finally, there has to be an appropriate incentive structure that will spur producers’ and
assistance agencies' efforts (especially one that makes rewards conditional upon
performance).
Of course, this does not constitute a ready blueprint for technical assistance. Even if
there were many more detailed analytical case studies about successful projects than we can31
draw upon at present – and we certainly do need more of them –, an ideal model is unlikely
ever to emerge. The design and implementation of every new project must always entail an
act of creativity to adapt and operationalise general principles in such a way as to fit well
within the local context within which it is to be implemented.
ENDNOTES
1 The main focus of this review is on programmes and projects with a direct technological content, such as
development and commercialisation of appropriate technologies, provision of technical extension services and
technical training. It does not deal with financial support schemes, even though these are very common in
developing countries. Financing can be given for a number of purposes, among which technological
improvement is only one – and often not the most important one. Venture capital and R&D financing for high-
tech small firms are exceptions, but these are not covered here because the scope of such schemes is still quite
limited in most developing countries.
2 This contrasts with the situation in developed economies where many small companies make significant
contributions to the generation of innovations (e.g., Cosh, Hughes and Wood, 1996; Rothwell and Zegveld,
1985), and where small firms staffed by educated professionals are well represented in new, knowledge-based
industries such as information technology and biotechnology.
3 For an elaboration of the distinction between poverty alleviation and business growth as objectives of small
enterprise support projects, see Dawson and Jeans (1997).
4 See especially Watanabe’s insightful studies about subcontracting linkages (e.g., Watanabe, 1983).
5 This argument is based on the ‘rigid factor proportions’ problem, first propounded by Eckaus (1955).
6 See Bongenaar and Szirmai (1998) for a detailed case study of the top-down approach in Tanzania.
7 Good examples are documented in Basant (1990), Ishikawa (1975), and Francks (1979).
8 See Basant (1990), Smillie (1991) and Powell (1995).
9 Their activities and performance have been evaluated in many studies, including several studies commissioned
by aid donors that were supporting these organisations. See, e.g., UNDP et al. (1988).
10 Few policy makers understood that the Japanese success in establishing elaborate and dynamic subcontractor
networks was first and foremost driven by an extreme capital scarcity in the economy, which affected even the
largest keiretsu (Watanabe, 1983).
11 Some writers claim that substantial de-industrialisation occurred in the region, although the evidence on this is
not conclusive. See World Bank (1994), pp. 149-152, for a discussion about the de-industrialisation debate.
12 See Lall (1992) and UNCTAD (1996) for good reviews of the capability literature.
13 Their main sources of inspiration are the economic organisation literature (transaction costs theory) and
sociological literature. The writers in this group are generally sensitive to the socio-political and institutional
context within which small industry clusters function, and these variables have received more attention than
‘hard’ economic and technological ones.
14 This view is not uncontested. There are some agencies, such as ApproTEC Kenya, that operate projects that
adhere to the so-called 'corporate approach' (Havers, 1998). This approach continues to gives central importance
to the introduction of technological hardware. A foreign NGO designs useful technologies for the benefit of
primarily poor consumers, and disseminate these as widely as possible. A few reasonably well-run small and
medium-sized manufacturers are contracted to make these products according to the specifications supplied by
the NGO, but any benefit they receive is primarily a means to the objective of reaching a large number of poor
end-users. There is no explicit attempt to transfer any design skills. Although the corporate approach is achieving
good results (in terms of its own objectives), it does not seem to make sense to view it as a full-fledged
alternative to the indigenous technology development approach (as done by the Donor Committee on Small
Enterprise Development, 1997) since it does not see small producers as the target beneficiaries and since it does
not explicitly aim to raise their technological standards.
15 This is in line with the ‘sub-sector approach’ to small enterprise promotion, which advocates that research and
assistance should concentrate on commodity-specific sub-sectors. By giving considerable weight to the study of
interactions between firms of different sizes and at different stages in the supply chain, this approach can provide32
a more thorough insight into the competitive context in which the target enterprises operate (Boomgard et al.,
1992).
16 The Singapore subsection is based on Wong (1994).
17 For example, in the case of  Malaysia’s car manufacturer Proton, small manufacturers gained access to
manufacturing know-how about complex car components in a similar way. A useful review of successful and less
successful policy experiences with subcontracting promotion in different developing countries is contained in
Altenburg (1997).
18 The Brazil subsection is based on Tendler and Amorim (1996).
19 The Kenya subsection is based on Tanburn (1996).
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